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In a microcosm of national and international trends in recent years, 
Louisiana saw a policy tug of war between the oil and gas industry and 
environmental advocates that shaped legal and legislative developments over 
the course of the past year.  
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II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
A. State Legislative Developments 
1. Proposed Constitutional Amendment: Property Tax Exemption for 
Goods Bound for the Outer Continental Shelf 
During the 2019 Regular Session, House Bill 234 was sent to the Secretary 
of State after passing by a vote of 83 to 12 in the Louisiana House of 
Representatives, and by a vote of 91 to 4 in the Senate.1  As a result, the 
citizens of Louisiana will go to the polls on October 12, 2019, to determine 
whether to amend the State Constitution to extend the ad valorem tax 
exemption for raw materials, goods, commodities, and other property to 
property destined for the Outer Continental Shelf.2 
If passed, Article VII, Sections 21(D)(2) and (3) of the Constitution of 
Louisiana, would be amended relative to ad valorem tax exemption for, 
“[r]aw materials, goods, commodities, and other articles being held on the 
public property of a port authority, on docks of any common carrier, or in a 
public or private warehouse, grain elevator, dock, wharf, or public storage 
facility in this state for export to a point outside the states of the United 
States.”3  The Amendment then goes on to specifically include goods bound 
for the outer continental shelf.  “For purposes of this Paragraph, ‘being held’ 
shall include raw materials, goods, commodities and other articles stored in 
Louisiana for maintenance or until ready for use with a destination to the 
Outer Continental Shelf.”4   
The Amendment is supported by the oil and gas industry, including the 
Louisiana Oil and Gas Association (“LOGA”), whose President, Gifford 
Briggs, stated that the proposed Amendment will provide clarity for 
Louisiana’s offshore operators, “LOGA worked hand in hand with Rep. 
Blake Miguez to provide some clarification to the tax code. Due to a 'unique' 
interpretation of Louisiana tax codes, oil companies in three parishes have 
recently been assessed a property tax on goods that were previously not 
taxed.”5  
                                                                                                                 
 1. H.B. 234, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Gifford Briggs, Roses and Thorns of the 2019 Session, LOUISIANA OIL & GAS 
ASSOCIATION (June 25, 2019), https://www.loga.la/news-and-articles/roses-and-thorns-of-
then-2019-session (last visited July 18, 2019). 
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2. Critical Infrastructure Law Amended to Prohibit Unauthorized Entry 
to Pipelines 
Effective August 1, 2018, Section 14.61 of the Louisiana Criminal Code 
was revised to add oil and gas pipelines to the definition of critical 
infrastructure.6  As a result, any person who, without authority to do so, enters 
onto the premises of a pipeline that is completely enclosed by any type of 
physical barrier, or who remains upon pipeline premises after having been 
forbidden to do so,7 may be punished by imprisonment with or without hard 
labor for not more than five years, and fined not more than one thousand 
dollars, or both.8  The amendment defines a pipeline as “flow, transmission, 
distribution, or gathering lines, regardless of size or length, which transmit 
or transport oil, gas, petrochemicals, minerals, or water in a solid, liquid, or 
gaseous state.”9  The definition of critical infrastructure was also amended to 
specifically include, “any site where the construction or improvement of any 
facility or structure referenced in this Section is occurring.”10  Accordingly, 
the statue protects the state’s existing pipelines, as well as pipeline 
construction sites from unauthorized entry. 
3. Bill Permitting Refineries and Industrial Plants to Self Report 
Violations of Environmental Rules Fails in the House 
House Bill 615 failed to pass in the House of Representatives after 
receiving 46 yea votes, and 41 nay votes; falling short of the 53 votes required 
to pass.11  The controversial bill that received national media coverage sought 
to authorize “certain voluntary health, safety, and environmental audits by 
facilities subject to regulation by the Department of Environmental 
Quality.”12  The facilities covered by the proposed bill would have included 
a pollution source or any public or private property or facility 
where an activity is conducted which is required to be regulated 
under this Subtitle and which does or has the potential to do any 
of the following: (a) Emit air contaminants into the atmosphere. 
(b) Discharge pollutants into waters of the state. (c) Use or control 
radioactive materials and waste. (d) Transport, process, or dispose 
                                                                                                                 
 6. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:61 (2019) (as amended by Act 692). 
 7. LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(A)(1) & (3) (2019). 
 8. LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(C) (2019).  
 9. LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(B)(3) (2019). 
 10. LA. STAT. ANN. §14:61(B)(1) (2019). 
 11. H.B. 615, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019). 
 12. Id. 
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of solid wastes. (e) Generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of 
hazardous wastes.13 
In addition to permitting the voluntary audits, the information discovered 
during said audits would have been privileged in civil and administrative 
proceedings, except in certain circumstances.14  Additionally, owners and 
operators would have been immune from administrative and civil penalties 
for any disclosed violation identified in a voluntary audit.15  Tyler Gray, head 
of the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, argued during 
committee debate that the bill would create an environment in which 
operators would self-report, and allow the Department of Environmental 
Quality to focus on bad actors.16  Conversely, opponents of the bill and 
environmentalists argued that the bill would have allowed the oil and gas 
industry to regulate itself.17  
B. State Regulatory Developments 
1. Plugging Credits Incentivize Operators to Plug Abandoned Wells 
The Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conversation, amended 
Title 43, Part XIX, Section 104 of the Louisiana Administrative Code to 
include the Plugging Credit Certificate Program.18  Under the program, “[a] 
Plugging Credit may be applied to any new or existing well in lieu of 
Financial Security required by Subsections A-H of this Section, on a 1 for 1 
or 2 for 1 basis.”19  A single credit being awarded for plugging and restoring 
the site of an orphan well after August 1, 2016, and one half of a credit 
awarded for plugging and restoring an operator’s existing well that has been 
inactive for a minimum of five years on or after August 1, 2016.20  One credit 
can be applied to an existing or newly drilled well so long as said well is: (a) 
in the same field as the plugged well; (b) is the same location type (land, 
                                                                                                                 
 13. LA. STAT. ANN.§30:2004(8). 
 14. See H.B. 615, § (B). 
 15. Id. § (E). 
 16. Bill to shield some Louisiana environment violations fails, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 
16, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/da4a1f8e77ee4543ac725ed3ce4ac28c (last visited July 
23, 2019). 
 17. Sam Karlin, Bill to keep Louisiana oil and gas industry's violations secret, immune 
from penalties narrowly fails, THE ADVOCATE (May 16, 2019) https://www.theadvocate. 
com/baton_rouge/news/politics/ 
legislature/article_7e6367de-7824-11e9-a53b-ef89fda3256f.html (last visited July 23, 2019). 
 18. 44 La. Reg. 2086 (November 20, 2018). 
 19. LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 104(J)(1). 
 20. Id. 
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inland water, or offshore) as the plugged well; and (c) has a total depth that 
does not exceed 2000′ more than the total depth or plug back depth, 
whichever is less, of the plugged well. (All depths TVD).21 
2. Alternative Source Well Requirements 
The Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conversation, amended 
Title 43, Part XIX, Subpart 1 in order to condense rules and procedures from 
several departments and to provide a single location for “a comprehensive 
compilation of procedural requirements for permitting, construction, 
operation, maintenance, plugging and abandonment of alternative source 
wells.”22  The regulation defines an Alternative Source Well as, “a well that 
produces water from a water-bearing stratum other than a ground water 
aquifer, underground source of drinking water (USDW's), or at a depth or 
location within a ground water aquifer containing water greater than 10,000 
mg/l TDS.”23  The new chapter provides regulations for the permitting, 
construction, maintenance, financial security, and plugging and 
abandonment of Alternative Source Wells.24 
C. Local Legislative Developments 
There was no local Louisiana legislation to report on. 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Federal Court Cases 
1. Eastern District Remands Coastal Parish Lawsuits Against the Oil 
and Gas Industry to State Court 
The Parish of Plaquemines and other Louisiana coastal parishes filed a 
total of 42 lawsuits in state court against more than 200 oil and gas companies 
alleging that, “dredging, drilling, and waste disposal caused coastal land loss 
and pollution” in violation of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources 
Management Act of 1978 (the “SLCRMA”).25  The SLCRMA provides a 
cause of action against defendants that violate a state-issued coastal use 
permit or fail to obtain a required coastal use permit.26  The plaintiffs solely 
                                                                                                                 
 21. LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 104(J)(4). 
 22. See 45 La. Reg. 575 (April 20, 2019). 
 23. LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § 805 (milligrams per liter of total dissolved solids). 
 24. See LA ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 801–829 (2019).  
 25. Parish of Plaquemines v. Riverwood Production Co., No. 18-5217, 2019 WL 
2271118, at *1 (E.D. La. May 28, 2019) 
 26. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. §49:214.36(D)). 
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argued the cause of action under the SLCRMA, and expressly disavowed any 
potential federal claims that could have been brought under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act, the Clean Water Act, federal regulations, or general maritime 
or admiralty law.27  Despite the plaintiff’s disclaimers, defendants for a 
second time removed the instant suit and similar suits to federal court, 
invoking federal subject matter jurisdiction, the federal officer removal 
statute, and the federal question statute.28 
At the outset of the opinion, the court agreed with plaintiffs that 
defendant’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1442.  The defendants 
argued that they first learned that the case was removable on April 30, 2018, 
when Plaintiff filed an expert report revealing pre-SLCRMA activities.29  
However, the court agreed that plaintiffs had identified pre-SLCRMA in their 
original petition in 2013, and that, at the latest, the 30 day removal period 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 was triggered on April 13, 2017.30  The court then 
went on to address each of defendants jurisdictional arguments. 
To assert federal officer jurisdiction, defendants must show that “(1) it is 
a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1442; (2) it ‘acted pursuant to a federal 
officer’s directions and that a causal nexus exists between its actions under 
color of federal office and the plaintiff’s claims [or charged conduct;]’ and 
(3) it has asserted a ‘colorable federal defense.’”31  Defendants argued that 
the oil operator defendants and their predecessors were under federal 
supervision and direction during World War II.32  The court disagreed, 
holding that “none of these documents establish the type of formal delegation 
that might authorize [the oil and gas companies] to remove the case.”33  The 
court found that federal officer jurisdiction as lacking because, “[t]hat the 
defendants may have complied with some federal oversight directives during 
WWII is precedentially insufficient to confer federal officer removal 
jurisdiction. The private oil and gas industry’s wartime compliance with 
federal laws or regulations falls short of being within the scope of ‘acting 
under’ a federal official for acts ‘under color’ of such office.”34 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at *2. 
 28. Id. at *3. 
 29. Id. at *5. 
 30. Id. at *7. 
 31. Id. at *8 (quoting Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 149 F.3d 387, 400 
(5th Cir. 1998)). 
 32. Id. at *11. 
 33. Id. at *14 (quoting Watson v. Philip Morris Co., 551 U.S. 142, 156 (2007)). 
 34. Id. at *17. 
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The court then addressed federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, which vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”35  Cases 
arise under federal law only if the well-pleaded complaint establishes either 
that: (1) “federal law creates the cause of action[;]” or (2) “the plaintiff’s right 
to relief [under state law] necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law.”36  In rejecting defendants assertion of federal 
question jurisdiction, the court noted that the defendants arguments were self 
defeating because they previously argued (in their timeliness argument) that 
the initial state court petitions did not reveal the existence of a federal 
question.37  Defendants immediately appealed the remand order under their 
federal officer removal predicate under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the Fifth 
Circuit currently has discretion to permit said appeal. 
2. Operators Prohibited from Charging Unleased Mineral Owners for 
Post-Production Costs  
In a case of first impression, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana held that oil and gas operators are prohibited 
from deducting post-production costs from an unleased mineral owner’s 
(“UMO”) share of production.38  In doing so, the Court relied on a clear an 
unambiguous reading of La. Rev. Stat. 30:10(A)(3), which states that a UMO 
is entitled to be paid its tract’s “pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale of 
production.”39  The operator, Chesapeake Louisiana, LP (“Chesapeake”), 
argued that the statute does nothing more than direct the time period within 
which operators may pay a UMO.  The Court disagreed and found that “this 
statutory provision directs both when an unleased mineral owner is to be paid 
and what he is to be paid – the payment of sales proceeds.”40  The Court also 
noted that the Legislature drew a distinction between UMOs and other 
nonparticipating working interest owners by using a broad and all-
encompassing definition of owners in Section 10(A)(2), while restricting the 
application of Section 10(A)(3) to unleased owners.41  In it’s Motion for 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A § 1331 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-56)). 
 36. Id. (citing Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689-90 
(2006)). 
 37. Id. at *18. 
 38. Johnson v. Chesapeake La., LP, No. 16-1543, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La. March 
1, 2019). 
 39. Id. at *4 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN §30:10(A)(3) (2019)). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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Summary Judgment, Chesapeake made additional arguments based on unjust 
enrichment and co-ownership; however, the Court refused to address said 
arguments because, “the Legislature has provided a specific rule for this 
situation.”42 
B. Supreme Court Cases  
There were no Louisiana Supreme Court decisions to report on. 
C. Appellate Activity  
1. Severance Taxes on Crude Oil Based on Gross Proceeds 
In Avanti Exploration, LLC v. Robinson, the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that the Louisiana Department of Revenue (the 
“Department”) erred in imposing severance taxes based on index pricing 
rather than based on gross proceeds.43 Two of Avanti’s purchasers in arms-
length transactions remitted severance taxes to the Department based upon 
the gross proceeds that Avanti received.  The Department audited Avanti’s 
records, and found that Avanti had impermissibly reduced its tax 
computation by subtracting transportation costs, which were deducted from 
Avanti’s gross proceeds pursuant to the two sales contracts.44  The Court 
noted that under the relevant statute: 
The severance tax is calculated on the producer's gross receipts on 
sales or by the posted field price, whichever is higher.  However, 
if a producer incurs transportation costs in getting his product to 
market, to a point of sale off the lease, he can subtract the 
transportation costs from his gross receipts and calculate the 
severance tax on the reduced amount.45  
The Court ruled out the possibility that the Department used a posted field 
price because “there was no traditional posted price in the field, which is 
apparently a practice that has been in disuse for many years.”46  Further, the 
Department offered no evidence to show how it arrived at its figures, and the 
Court concluded that the Department erroneously added back the pricing 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at *5 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2019) (“When no rule for a particular 
situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according 
to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.”)). 
 43. Avanti Expl., LLC v. Robinson, 268 So.3d 1093 (La. Ct. App. 2019).   
 44. Id. at 1095. 
 45. Id. at 1094 (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:633(7) (2019)). 
 46. Id. at 1097. 
 46. Id. at 1100. 
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differential to the large market center indices contemplated in Avanti’s 
contracts.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in the absence of a posted 
field price, gross proceeds received by an operator must be used to calculate 
an operator’s severance tax liability.  
2. Coastal Use Permit Issued by the Department of Natural Resources 
Upheld  
On April 3, 2017, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 
(“DNR”) issued a Coastal Use Permit (“CUP”) to Bayou Bridge Pipeline, 
LLC (“Bayou Bridge”) for the construction of a petroleum pipeline from St. 
Charles to St. James.47  Plaintiffs filed petitions for reconsideration with the 
DNR, and the DNR denied their petition but addressed their concerns in a 
written response.  Plaintiffs then filed the instant action for judicial review 
asserting that:  
(1) DNR did not consider the potential adverse environmental 
impacts of the proposed pipeline on St. James Parish; (2) DNR 
ignored its constitutional and regulatory duties to consider the 
cumulative impact of the proposed pipeline on St. James Parish; 
(3) DNR ignored evidence that the people of St. James Parish may 
be trapped in the event of an emergency with no viable evacuation 
plan; and (4) DNR misapplied its own Guidelines.48 
The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, finding that the DNR did not 
apply Coastal Use Guidelines, and ordered Bayou Bridge to “to develop 
effective environmental protection and emergency or contingency plans 
relative to evacuation in the event of a spill or other disaster, in accordance 
with guideline 719(K), PRIOR to the continued issuance of said permit.”49  
DNR and Bayou Bridge appealed the judgment.  The Fifth Circuit reversed 
the trial court, finding that: (i) the DNR’s conclusion that certain Coastal Use 
Guidelines did not apply was not unreasonable or arbitrary; (ii) the DNR did 
not fail to require effective environmental spill cleanup and emergency 
response plans; (iii) the evidence supported a finding that the DNR satisfied 
its constitutional public trust duty when issuing the CUP.50 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Joseph v. Sec’y, La. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 18-414 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/19); 265 So.3d 
945, 947-948. 
 48. Id. at 948. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See generally, Joseph, 18-414 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/30/19); 265 So.3d 945. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
160 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
3. Deed Listing Well Names and Quarter-Section Property Descriptions 
Sufficient to Place Third Parties on Notice 
In 1977, Caroline Hunt (“Hunt”) inherited a fractional mineral interest in 
and to a tract of land in Jackson Parish from her father.  In 1988, Hunt filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Texas, and executed a deed as a part of the 
bankruptcy proceedings in favor of R. Carter Pate, as Trustee, effective 
January 8, 1990, and recorded in Jackson Parish on February 6, 1992.51  Said 
deed conveyed: 
the wells described on Exhibit “A” attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference for all purposes (collectively, the 
“Wells” or singularly, a “Well”); and all mineral estates, mineral 
leases, oil and gas leases, oil, gas, hydrocarbons and mineral 
leases and other interests of any kind whatsoever in any mineral 
estate, together with all oil, gas and other minerals produced 
therefrom, whether known or unknown, metallic or nonmetallic, 
common or unique (and the proceeds of the sale thereof), 
including, without limitation, gravel, shale, lignite, sulphur, gold, 
silver, lead, zinc, copper, iron, coal, gas, oil, casinghead gas, other 
hydrocarbons, uranium, steam, geothermal energy and all other 
minerals or substances and all royalty interests, overriding royalty 
interests, net profits interests, production payments and similar 
interests described in Exhibit “A”, any amendments, renewals, 
extensions, replacements or modifications thereof, and each and 
every kind and character of right, title, claim or interest which 
Grantors have in and to the interests, properties and lands set forth 
on Exhibit “A”, and any other surface estates, in the above-
referenced County and State as of the Effective Time (as 
hereinafter defined)(collectively, the “Leases”). The description 
of the Wells in Exhibit “A” and the description of the Leases in 
Exhibit “A” are not intended to limit each other, it being the intent 
of the Grantor and Grantee that this Deed convey every interest of 
Grantor in and to the Leases described in Exhibit “A” irrespective 
of whether the extent to which any Well is located on, includes or 
is related in any such Lease, and that this Deed convey every 
interest of Grantor in and to every Well described in Exhibit “A” 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Compass Energy Operating, LLC v. Robena Prop. & Royalty Co., 52,468 (La.App. 2 
Cir. 2/27/19); 265 So.3d 1160, 1162-63. 
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irrespective of whether or the extent to which any such Well is 
located on or related to any Lease.52 
Exhibit “A” of the deed contained the following descriptions, and the deed 












Subsequently, on February 6, 1992, R. Carter Pate, as Trustee, conveyed 
the mineral interests to several parties, including Robena Operating & 
Royalty Company.54  In a separate chain of title, a deed recorded on October 
1, 1997, stated that the mineral interest acquired by the United States from 
Caroline Hunt was sold to Wayne Pender and A.O. Milstead, Jr.  In yet 
another chain of title, on January 12, 1998, Caroline Hunt and her mother’s 
estate conveyed the mineral interest to Wayne Pender, Linda Blaylock 
Pender, Andrew Ordell Milstead, Jr., and Florentina Rodriguez Milstead.  
Dynex Royalties would acquire a mineral interest in the property through this 
chain of title.55 
Compass Energy Operating, LLC (“Compass”), the operator of a unit that 
included the subject mineral interest filed a petition in concursus to resolve 
the disputed mineral interest ownership, naming Robena Property & Royalty 
Company, Ltd., Dynex Royalties, and the Milsteads as defendants.  The 
Milsteads prevailed at the trial court after arguing that Louisiana law required 
the liquidating trust agreement to be recorded in Jackson Parish to own 
immovable property there, and that the description in the Pate deed did not 
provide adequate notice to third parties who acquired an adverse interest.  
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Second Circuit held that the 
liquidating trust agreement did not need to be recorded in Jackson Parish 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 1163. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1165. 
 55. Id. at 1166. 
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because it was a trust created under the authority of a United States 
bankruptcy court--not under the Louisiana Trust Code, and because the deed 
itself “clearly established from whence Pate's interest in the property 
originated.”56  Next, the court held that the description in the Pate deed 
satisfied the public records doctrine, as set forth by La. Civ. Code art. 3338:   
Exhibit A lists wells in one column and then various property 
descriptions in another column. Thus, to the right of the 
“McDowell” well is the property description of “SW/4 Sec. 2, 
SE/4 Sec. 3, NE/4 Sec. 10, NW/4 Sec. 11, all T-16-N, R-2-W.” 
Within the SW/4 of Section 2 is the property at issue in this matter, 
namely the E/2 of SE/4 of SW/4 of Section 2 in T-16-N, R-2-W. 
Thus, Exhibit A clearly designates the property in which the Hunts 
conveyed ‘every kind and character of right, title, claim, or 
interest’ to Pate, that being the property at issue.57 
Accordingly, the deed description was “sufficiently specific to place third 
parties on notice of what had been conveyed.”58 
4. Materialman’s Lien does not Affect New Leases Executed by Mineral 
Servitude Owners 
In Marlborough Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations, 
Inc., the owner of a mineral servitude sought a declaratory judgment from 
the court declaring that an oil well lien did not encumber its mineral 
servitude, or attach to a well located on the leasehold for which the 
materialman did not furnish labor or equipment.59  Marlborough Oil & Gas, 
L.L.C. (“Marlborough”) was the owner of the oil and gas servitude for the 
leasehold upon which Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. (“Baker 
Hughes”) furnished labor, equipment, machinery, materials, and related 
services to Northwind Oil & Gas, Inc (“Northwind”) in connection with its 
operations on the Marlborough Oil & Gas, LLC No. 3 well.60 Northwind 
failed to pay $412,415.64 owed to Baker Hughes for the goods and services 
provided, and as a result, Baker Hughes recorded an “Oil Well Lien 
Affidavit, Notice of Claim of Lien and Statement of Privilege” pursuant to 
the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”), La. Rev. Stat. § 9:4861-4873. 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 1167-68. 
 57. Id. at 1169. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Marlborough Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations, Inc., 2018-
0557 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/14/18); 367 So.3d 102. 
 60. Id. at 104. 
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Baker Hughes then received summary judgment against Northwind and was 
awarded the sum of the lien.61 
Marlborough then filed its petition for declaratory judgment, and the trial 
court held that the summary judgment in favor of Baker Hughes was “of no 
legal effect or consequence, insofar and only insofar as to (1) [Marlborough], 
its successors, lessees and assigns and (2) the mineral servitude owned by 
[Marlborough] affecting the leased property as described in the judgment” or 
as to the Marlborough No. 1 Well.62  Baker Hughes appealed the decision, 
and the First Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that, “the 
privilege granted [by the lien] is not restricted to the proceeds of the well 
actually drilled, but rather exists on the entire lease as a whole,” and 
therefore, the lien was effective as to both the Marlborough No. 3 Well and 
the Marlborough No. 1 Well.63  The court then addressed Marlborough’s 
claim that the lien created a cloud on its title–holding that no cloud existed 
because Baker Hughes could only seize production pursuant to the operating 
interest/lease under which Northwind operated, and thus, “any new lease 
negotiated by Marlborough would not be affected by the Baker Hughes' lien 
and judgment at issue herein.”64 
D. Trial Activity  
There were no Louisiana Trial Court orders to report on. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 105. 
 63. Id. at 107 (citing Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Serv’s, Inc., 657 So.2d 1307, 
1312 (La. Ct. App. 1995)). 
 64. Id. at 109. 
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